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Abstract—Fungibility is a common assumption for market-
based spectrum management. In this paper, we explore the
dimensions of practical fungibility of frequency bands from the
point of view of the spectrum buyer who intends to use it. The
exploration shows that fungibility is a complex, multidimensional
concept that cannot casually be assumed. We develop two ideas
for quantifying fungibility - (i) of a fungibility space in which
the “distance” between two slices of spectrum provides score of
fungibility and (ii) a probabilistic score of fungibility.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secondary markets for radio spectrum are seen as a step
toward continuous reassignment of radio spectrum to its high-
est purpose and to enable correct valuation of wireless service
providers [1]. The fungibility of electromagnetic spectrum has
been broadly recognized to be a requirement of feasible spec-
trum markets [1]–[6]. At the same time, conventional wisdom
among researchers and policymakers questions whether the
fungibility requirement holds in practice. In order to shed
light on this, we examine the question of fungibility of radio
spectrum in this paper.
Electromagnetic spectrum is valuable because it enables
capabilities that increase social welfare. These capabilities
usually involve purposeful communications that may be uni-
directional or bidirectional; for the purpose of this paper,
we assume that this is the case. The question then arises
as to what exactly is the value of a slice of electromagnetic
spectrum? Is one slice exactly identical to another slice of the
same size, but at a different frequency (i.e., will it provide
the same communication capabilities)? While for example,
Kwerel and Williams assert that frequencies in the 300 MHz
to 3000 MHz band are “approximately fungible” [4], more
recent research indicates different auction prices obtained for
different frequencies in this band [7] in practice, indicating
that the economic value is not the same for different slices
of spectrum. Outside of this economic evidence, we examine
technical and practical issues related to the fungibility of
spectrum, such as the allowed transmit power and physical
layer alternatives, the propagation characteristics at different
frequencies, the interference features, the capabilities of the
communicating devices, and the application needs since they
all influence the communication capabilities afforded by a slice
of spectrum at a specific frequency.
Our objective is to record the factors influencing fungibility.
Such an examination and characterization would be beneficial
in modeling the value of slices of electromagnetic spectrum,
perhaps in secondary markets. The exploration shows that
fungibility is a complex, multidimensional concept that cannot
casually be assumed. We develop two ways of determining
spectrum fungibility – (i) using the idea of a fungibility
space in which the “distance” between two slices of spectrum
provides the fungibility score and (ii) a probabilistic fungibility
score reflecting the likelihood of two bands being fungible.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we
define the term “fungible” both economically and as it pertains
to radio systems. In Section III, we qualitatively describe the
limits of fungibility of spectrum. Section IV translates these
limits into reality based on the available research literature.
Section V concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Economic definitions of fungibility
Merriam-Webster defines “fungible” as
“being of such a nature that one part or quantity may
be replaced by another equal part or quantity in the
satisfaction of an obligation.”
The main idea here is that of substitutability. When com-
modities are fungible, one instance of an item can replace
another instance of that item “in the satisfaction of obligation”.
Such an obligation may simply be a trade or commitment to
buy or sell. This suggests that one instance of a commodity
is of equal value to the other instance of the commodity.
In physical commodities, we might say that gold is fungible
because any ounce of gold can substitute for any other ounce
of gold as long as the purity and weight of each ounce meets
the same standards. In physical commodities, such as metals,
grains, meats, etc., fungibility is obtained by defining standard
trading units [8]. Thus, when traders buy or sell a commodities
contract, they have a clear understanding of what they are
buying or selling even if they never inspect the item.
B. Importance of fungibility
Fungibility is important in economic transactions because
it leads to lower transaction costs, which, in turn, leads to
markets (as an organizational form) [9]. When goods are not
fungible, markets are unlikely to emerge because they cannot
allocate transaction costs efficiently. Non-fungible goods often
lead to vertically integrated systems (i.e., hierarchies) which
poses some challenges to the valuation and dynamic change
in the wireless industry.
C. Operational definitions for radio systems
Doyle and Forde [3] summarize the approaches taken over
time in an effort to define property rights in spectrum. Weiser
and Hatfield [10] discuss the challenges of defining these
property rights, and Hazlett [11] argues that adjudication is
possible despite these challenges. Weiss and Liu [12] propose
an alternative to the usage rights paradigm through markets in
interference rights.
Despite these debates, there is general agreement that spec-
trum rights, to the extent that they may be tradeable, must
be defined in space, time and frequency at the very least. We
elaborate on this in later sections.
D. Economic evidence of spectrum trades
Fungibility does not appear to drastically affect the volume
of spectrum trades in the US: Mayo and Wallsten [13] ex-
amined the FCC’s Universal Licensing System database and
discovered that trades were hardly uncommon across a variety
of service bands. It is, however, important to note that this
may not be generalized to other countries, as is clear from
Akalu’s work [2], [14]. Since the regulatory agencies do not
publicize prices, it is not possible to build a secondary market
demand curve by frequency. In fact, the trades in the US and
the UK do not use exchange markets, but rather brokers (e.g.,
SpectrumBridge, Cantor Fitzgerald, etc.).
E. Who makes the determination of fungibility?
It is a maxim in markets that an asset is worth what
someone will pay for it. More generally, in a (voluntary)
market exchange, a trade can take place when the price is
above the seller’s reservation price and below the buyer’s
willingness-to-pay.
We assume that a buyer acquires spectrum because it
enables him/her to accomplish a valuable function; thus, we
exclude speculative spectrum purchases. Consequently, it is
the buyer of spectrum that determines whether a frequency
band is sufficiently equivalent to another (i.e., fungible) for
their particular requirement.
Nevertheless, from the standpoint of quantifying fungibility,
the lack of markets and a standardized unit of spectrum
(save that of bandwidth) implies that we have to resort to
known technical and regulatory factors as potential metrics as
discussed below.
III. ON THE FUNGIBILITY OF “NAKED SPECTRUM”
User demands take place at a particular point in time and
point (region) in space. A system to meet user demands or
needs must be able to provide communication capability to
that point in space at that time, usually through one or more
other points in space (i.e., system architecture components
such as access points or base stations). Thus, we can conclude
that communications demand is a (potentially complex) spatio-
temporal phenomenon, so spectrum demand for purposeful use
is also a complex spatio-temporal phenomenon. Fungibility,
therefore, is limited in space and time. Further, technological
and regulatory issues complicate fungibility determination as
described below.
In this section, we explore in modest detail the factors that
would affect a buyer’s decision about whether a particular
offered frequency band is a reasonable substitute for another
(i.e., is fungible). The object to be traded is what Hazlett
has referred to as “naked spectrum”, that is, frequency bands
only with no infrastructure supporting it [15]. Technologically,
this discussion is deliberately superficial, focusing only on the
main factors that influence fungibility. The authors are aware
that the technological alternatives are far richer than presented
here, and that these present tradeoffs that could influence a
fungibility determination one way or the other.
A. Spatial
In space, the coverage of a signal depends on the carrier
frequency. To illustrate, let us assume a very simple free-space
path-loss model where the path-loss Lp is given by:
Lp = 21.98− 20 log10(c/f) + 20 log10 d (1)
where c is the speed of light, f is the frequency of the carrier,
and d is the distance between the transmitter and receiver.
Even under such a simple model, for the same transceiver
features (transmit power and receiver sensitivity), clearly the
coverage d depends on the frequency f . As shown in Figure 1,
the coverage varies significantly with frequency. If coverage
is the primary criterion, then spectrum becomes fungible in
one direction – a slice at a lower frequency can always be
used by someone who would have been willing to use a slice
at a higher frequency (again, site specificity may still have an
impact).
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Fig. 1. Coverage at different frequencies assuming free-space loss when
transmit power is 4W and minimum acceptable received power is -80 dBm
In architecture, the utility of a particular frequency band can
depend on its fit to the existing infrastructure. For example,
as Figure 1 illustrates, coverage for systems built for one
frequency band, say 1500 MHz may not be able to provide
full coverage at, say, 2500 MHz. This does not mean that
these two frequencies are not fungible, simply that the existing
infrastructure may not suit all user demands if 2500 MHz were
used. Further, some of the coverage effects can be to some
extent mitigated by investments in high gain antennas and
higher transmission power (within economic and regulatory,
constraints, of course). We observe that it would still be up
to the buyer to determine if the higher frequency of 2500
MHz would meet the coverage requirement. If it did, spectrum
at these two frequencies could be thought of as fungible
(assuming other factors discussed below are not important)
for the buyer’s application. If it did not, then they would not
be fungible.
Alternately, fungibility could be a function of price. Kerans
et.al. [7] showed that the coverage differences described above
affect prices in the primary (auction) market outcomes. In
part, the differences in auction prices are due to the larger
infrastructure investment requirements to cover the same area
with higher frequency channels. It is reasonable to assume that
they would affect outcomes in the secondary (trading) markets
as well. That is, if a band is sufficiently cheap, a buyer might
consider it fungible with another, more costly band that may
meet his or her technical or operational requirements better.
B. Temporal
An example of how the availability or usefulness of spec-
trum changes over time is shortwave radio communications.
Transmissions at certain frequencies in the shortwave bands
are reflected by the ionosphere only at night allowing long
range communications then, but not during the day. Another
example of temporal variations is the load in cellular tele-
phone networks. As noted in [16], the load in a cell varies
significantly with time of day and day of week. For example,
downtown areas may see significant loads during the day
and light or no traffic at nights. In [16], the authors use
this feature to dim cell sites to save energy. It is possible
to allow secondary access to unused spectrum in the cellular
bands when there is little usage. In fact, it may be possible
to simply use the same cellular network infrastructure for
secondary applications, especially with the ability of today’s
smart phones to perform a variety of generalized tasks, making
this spectrum really attractive. This however assumes that
such applications need spectrum only when the usage by
the primary license holder is negligible. Similar temporal
variations in availability of spectrum is discussed in [17].
C. Technological
There are several technological factors that impact fungibil-
ity. We consider a few of the most common factors below.
Systems that require two way communications must choose
a form of duplexing. In general, there are two kinds of
duplexing: Frequency Division Duplexing (FDD) and Time
Division Duplexing (TDD). In FDD, the uplink and downlink
channels are separated in frequency. By contrast, TDD systems
use a single channel that is alternately uplink and downlink.
Implementation tradeoffs abound and there is a literature com-
paring these approaches and evaluating the tradeoffs (see [18]
and [19], for example). From the point of view of fungibility,
one key factor is that an FDD system requires spectrum that is
paired because the uplink and the downlink operate at different
frequencies. Further, these have to be sufficiently far apart
for cost effective systems with minimal crosstalk between the
uplink and downlink (45 MHz for GSM systems). Thus, an
FDD system needs a pair of channels that are sufficiently far
apart (but not too far) that meet the spatio-temporal coverage
requirements discussed above to be considered fungible with
another pair of channels.
The air interface can also be a factor. FDMA systems are
in some senses the easiest to consider, since the purchaser
would acquire a clear spectrum band. TDMA and CDMA
systems require much closer coordination between primary
and secondary users, which means that a candidate band would
only be suitable if the air interface was compatible with the
buyers system. That is a spectrum opportunity in a band where
the operator is using TDMA band may not be fungible with
an otherwise similar band in frequency, etc. for a system using
CDMA.
Finally, the usage of spectrum slices adjacent to the ones
under consideration and the applications they support may
impact what could be done with the spectrum. That is, a
key question is compatibility with neighboring systems in the
band that is being considered. For example, as widely reported
over the last couple of years [20], the company Lightsquared
has rights to the spectrum in the range of 1525-1559 MHz.
However, it was unable to employ this spectrum for terrestrial
mobile broadband services because of the harmful interference
it would cause to navigation and precision positioning services
employing the 1559-1610 MHz slices. While satellite services
at low power in the 1525-1559 MHz spectrum were still pos-
sible, other applications would not be easily feasible reducing
the value of this spectrum. Additional costs of upgrading
navigational receivers would only solve part of the problem,
as precision positioning would still be impacted.
D. Regulatory and Other Issues
Finally, the intended purpose of the spectrum (i.e., its
allocation) and regulatory considerations can also play a role.
For example the necessary throughput and delay can affect
the choice of spectrum. Regulatory requirements may limit
the use of certain bands to certain applications, modulation
schemes, power levels, etc. (e.g., the AM band may only
be used for broadcasting-related purposes, with power and
modulation limitations as specified by the national regulatory
authority).
IV. TOWARDS A “FUNGIBILITY SCORE”
The fungibility requirement thus has spatial, temporal, tech-
nological, and regulatory dimensions as discussed above. Spa-
tial aspects are determined by the antenna type and placement,
permitted transmission power and electromagnetic propagation
characteristics. Temporal dimensions are determined by the
needs of the application and the availability of the band; this
is especially relevant in time limited secondary use situations.
The technological dimensions can include duplexing (FDD or
TDD), air interface, modulation, etc. The regulatory dimension
considers the possibility of using a spectrum slice for a
particular application.
The question that we tackle next is to quantify fungibil-
ity in a meaningful manner. In [1], the authors propose a
“viability score” to assess the general viability of alternative
approaches to spectrum trading markets. The use of such a
score enabled them to combine a variety of measures into
a single metric that enabled comparison across scenarios.
As we discussed above, a determination of fungibility is
a comparative exercise that is conducted by the (potential)
buyer. Buyers are evaluating whether spectrum opportunity A
is substitutable for spectrum opportunity B with respect to
their spatio-temporal and technological requirements. From the
standpoint of the secondary user, then, the important questions
for both spectrum opportunities are:
• Can I tune my radios to the target band?
• Does the target band meet my minimum throughput
requirements?
• Does the target spectrum opportunity meet my duplexing
requirements?
• Does the target spectrum opportunity meet my minimum
spatial coverage requirements?
• Can I support the applicable air interface requirements?
All of these can be viewed simply as binary variables based
on minimum requirements, but it may prove to be less useful
to end users if we provide only a binary answer as to whether
two slices of spectrum are fungible. More quantitative answers
to these questions can be derived from objective characteristics
of the target spectrum, including: frequency band, bandwidth,
geographic area, duplex type, and technical and regulatory
limitations. Because of the stochastic nature of electromagnetic
propagation, some of these properties (notably throughput and
coverage) are not deterministic. The answers to the questions
also depend on the location(s) of the secondary user’s infras-
tructure. So, in general, we do not see the fungibility of two
frequency bands as absolute (or with 100% probability).
Instead, we believe that we can only speak of two bands
being fungible along a continuum, defined by a fungibility
score. We consider two different ways of obtaining this score.
The first approach looks at two bands “being fungible with
probability x for user y and application z”. The fungibility
score could then be this probability. Considering each of the
dimensions as independent, the overall fungibility score would
be a product of the probabilities. The second approach looks
at a normalized “distance” between two bands in a multidi-
mensional fungibility space and quantifies the score through
this distance. In computing “distance” between two bands,
it becomes necessary to “weight” the distance or normalize
the distance so that one particular dimension does not always
overwhelm the other fungibility dimensions; alternatively, the
weight of a dimension can reflect the relative importance of
the dimension in the eyes of the buyer.
What we are proposing here is not an absolute measure
of fungibility, but a framework to evaluate fungibility that
can evolve with information about additional parameters in
each category. In doing so, it is important to recognize that
the structure of a metric depends on what it is used for. For
example, a spectrum broker is interested in fungibility, not
because s/he is buying it, but because they need to market
and price available frequency bands (or bundles of bands) in
particular markets to potential buyers. Alternatively, spectrum
buyers may be interested in sorting or prioritizing bands for
consideration for their system application. These differing
objectives could result in differing approaches to developing
a fungibility score.
We propose two such approaches here, fully aware that
others may exist as well. We refer to them as the “proba-
bilistic” and the “distance-based” approaches. The former is
not necessarily probabilistic in the technical sense, though a
spectrum broker might use it as a measure for the likelihood
of making a trade. The second approach uses a Euclidean dis-
tance strategy to assess how “far” two spectrum opportunities
are away from each other. A buyer may use this to prioritize
spectrum opportunities.
A. Probabilistic and Distance-based Fungibility Scores
Next we consider the calculation of the fungibility score
using these two approaches in various dimensions. We will
assume in what follows, that the spectrum that a user’s need
is centered around f1 with a bandwidth of W1 Hz while
the spectrum that is being considered as a (fungible) option
is centered around f2 with a bandwidth of W2 Hz. Unless
otherwise mentioned, we will assume that W1 =W2.
a) Spatial: In the spatial dimension, there are still many
variables that have to be accounted for. First, the transmit pow-
ers may be variable depending on the regulatory constraints.
Second, the available/necessary infrastructure to provide cov-
erage may be different. For instance, multiple base stations
may still be able to provide coverage while employing a lower
power or higher frequency (which typically has higher path-
loss). The environment-specific issues have to be considered in
the computation of path-loss. To keep the computation simple,
in this preliminary work we only consider point-to-point-like
links in free space with the same transmit power and receiver
capabilities for comparing slices of spectrum.
Probabilistic Score: We can now use the fraction of coverage
provided by the alternative slice of spectrum as the unit for the
probabilistic score. In this case, the fraction of coverage pro-
vided can be determined easily as follows. With the transmit
powers and receiver capabilities the same, the allowable path-
loss has to be the same in both systems for communication
links to be created. Thus, from (1):
log10
d2
d1
= log10
f1
f2
⇒ Pspatial = min
(
d2
d1
, 1
)
= min
(
f1
f2
, 1
)
(2)
where Pspatial is the probabilistic score. We note here that
a frequency f2 < f1 may provide greater coverage than
necessary, in which case, we assume that 100% coverage is
available.
Distance Score: For the purposes of this paper, we would like
to constrain the distance to be between 0 and 1. For that reason,
we pick the following distance metric. Let d1 (d2) be the
coverage obtained using f1 (f2) with a given transmit power
and receiver capability in free space. The distance Dspatial in
this dimension would be:
Dspatial =
max(d1 − d2, 0)
d1
(3)
We note here that if f2 = f1, i.e., we are comparing a band
with itself, the probabilistic score would be Pspatial = 1 and
the distance score would be Dspatial = 0.
b) Temporal: As is the case with the spatial dimension,
the temporal dimension has many variables. For simplicity, we
will only consider the availability Tf2,av of the band at f2 over
a fixed unit of time T for which the band at f1 is available.
If f2 is not available completely for this duration, the fraction
of time that it is available will be used as the metric for the
probabilistic score and the normalized difference in duration
will be the distance, i.e.,
Ptemporal =
min(Tf2,av, T )
T
(4)
Dtemporal =
max(T − Tf2,av, 0)
T
(5)
Note if Tf2,av ≥ T , Ptemporal = 1 and Dtemporal = 0.
c) Technological: This is perhaps the most complex
dimension to be quantified and may vary on a case-by-case
basis. In other words, it is not easy to provide general expres-
sions as is the case of spatial and temporal availability. We
acknowledge that in this paper we do not rigorously capture
the various issues in the technological dimension. In fact,
we only consider the technological dimension in a heuristic
way. There is however the potential to include reasonable, yet
simple models to account for various technological factors. We
enumerate our heuristic approach next for a few technological
issues.
1) Duplexing: We will assume a cost for time division
duplexing when the preference is for a paired channel.
Assuming that the bandwidth is the same, we assign a
probabilistic score of 0.5 (i.e., an unpaired channel has
a 50% chance of being suitable for the application) or
a distance score that is also 0.5 (an unpaired channel
is not completely unsuitable, but it is not completely
compatible either).
2) Frequency Tunability: With the increased sophistica-
tion of technology, frequency tunability is becoming
less of an issue for most devices. For example, as
far back as 2008, Broadcom had integrated 802.11n,
Bluetooth, and FM (both transmission and reception)
into its BMC4329 chip [21]. Most smartphones of today
can support a variety of frequency bands for cellular
communications (ranging from 500 MHz to 3 GHz), a
variety of unlicensed spectrum for WiFi and Bluetooth
(2.4 GHz, 3.2 GHz, 5 GHz), near-field communication
support, and even FM. Consequently, we ignore this
as a factor although very likely there will be a cost
associated with specific bands as far as hardware goes
(see Section V for one example). This cost can again be
heuristically quantified as a number between 0 and 1.
3) Interference: There are two ways in which interfer-
ence can impact the fungibility scores. The interference
that a band faces from adjacent bands may reduce its
fungibility by reducing the useful coverage area for a
given application. The restrictions on interference that
may be caused by using a certain band on applications
in adjacent bands may reduce the usability of a certain
spectrum for certain applications. The former example
is considered in more detail in Section V. The Light-
squared case alluded to previously in the paper is an
example of the latter. Clearly, it is possible to use the
appropriate propagation models, receiver characteristics,
etc. to quantify this effect. As this is not the goal of
the paper, we again use a heuristic metric between 0
and 1 (we show one calculation of this number for the
700 MHz bands) to quantify this effect. Additionally,
there are possibilities for overcoming interference (see
a technical example in [22] for a fairly sophisticated
scenario), again at a cost to a buyer that needs to be
quantified appropriately in the fungibility score.
d) Regulatory and Miscellaneous: We adopt a heuristic
metric here (in our examples, we use the extremes of 1 and
0 for the probabilistic score and distance scores respectively)
as this is not easy to quantify in a general setting like the
technological dimension. In the illustrative case study below,
we show some sample heuristic scores.
B. Computing the Overall Fungibility Score
Given two slices of spectrum A and B, the fungibility score
can be computed as follows. Let D be the set of dimensions
under consideration. For example, D = {Spatial, Temporal,
Duplexing, Interference, Regulatory}. Then:
PA,B =
∏
i∈D
Pi (6)
DA,B =
∑
i∈D
Di (7)
Here, we assume that the dimensions are independent in
determining the overall probabilistic score PA,B and that
the dimensions are equally important (weight = 1 for all
dimensions) in computing DA,B although there is an inherent
normalization of distances to be between 0 and 1. The overall
fungibility scores are fairly simple and could certainly be
improved with better models for these dimensions. Alternative
approaches for improvement are also possible as discussed
next.
C. Improving the Fungibility Score
Perhaps the economics alone should really determine if
two spectrum bands are fungible. We could imagine a third
party making observations over numerous buyer/seller/band
tuples of successful and failed transactions and coming to
probability based on that, and then modeling the components
of that observation-based probability. We dont have a history
of trials, so were left with estimating what the probability of
a successful transaction would be based on the components
that we elaborate. But outcomes also have to do with price,
which would be informed by the probability – that is, a broker
might negotiate price for transactions that s/he judges having
a lower probability.
Regarding the distance measure, if we assume that potential
spectrum buyers have to evaluate an array of spectrum offers,
then they may wish to sort the offers somehow a weighted
N -dimensional distance measure would provide an aid to this
(with N being the number of attributes as discussed above).
The weights are determined from the buyers preferences and
constraints. Taken a step further (and beyond the scope of this
paper), a buyer could sort first on aggregate score. Then the
buyer could sort the aggregate score AND, say technology.
For example, if a buyer is using FDD, s/he would prefer a
paired offer, which should show up as the closest offer; having
said that, a non-paired offer could be interesting if (1) another
non-paired offer existed with a sufficient frequency offset or
(2) it could be used to augment a downstream channel for
asymmetric capacity networks. The latter could be worked out
by this kind of multilevel sort strategy.
In our ongoing and future work, we are looking at agent-
based simulations with more accurate models for spatial,
temporal and technological factors with embedded economic
models to evaluate the simple fungibility scores outlined in
this paper against simulated values that brokers or buyers may
arrive at through their evaluation process.
V. ILLUSTRATIVE CASE STUDIES
To keep things simple, in this paper we will assume that the
spectrum slice is available for the duration of the secondary
application (i.e., Ptemporal = 1, Dtemporal = 0).
A. The 700 MHz Bands
We will first consider an example in the 700 MHz bands
[23] that were freed from broadcast television and are now
licensed to cellular service providers to demonstrate the ap-
plication of the fungibility score. Some background material
is discussed first. The reasons for picking blocks within these
bands for computation of the fungibility scores are that (a) they
mostly eliminate the problems of coverage (spatial dimension)
and frequency tunability, making the interference dimension
important and (b) there has recently been significant interest
in trading these bands for other bands.
Figure 2 shows the so-called lower 700 MHz bands that
range from 698 MHz to 746 MHz. The spectrum is broken
up into several blocks labeled A through E. Blocks labeled A,
B, C are paired, i.e., they can be used in services that employ
FDD, while the blocks labeled D, E are unpaired. Each of these
blocks is 6 MHz wide. Adjacent to the lower block labeled A
is Channel 51 (also 6 MHz wide) that is assigned to broadcast
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Fig. 2. The Lower 700 MHz Bands
television. A TV tower could potentially broadcast a signal in
this band with transmit power of 1000 kW [23]. The paired
upper block labeled A is adjacent to the unpaired block labeled
E where a transmitter could operate at a power that could be
as high as 50 kW.
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Fig. 3. The Upper 700 MHz Bands
Figure 3 shows the so-called upper 700 MHz bands. We do
not show all of the spectrum allocated here, but focus on the
paired blocks labeled Cu. The FCC actually labels them also
as C, but we have renamed them to avoid confusion with the
lower C blocks. The Cu blocks are each 11 MHz wide.
1) First Scenario: Let us consider the scenario where a
service provider has to make a choice between two sets of
spectrum that are 12 MHz wide. The preferred slice corre-
sponds to the paired B bands in the lower 700 MHz. The
available alternatives are as follows:
• Set I: Paired A bands in the lower 700 MHz
• Set II: Unpaired bands D, E
The service provider computes the fungibility scores for these
two sets as follows. For both Sets I and II, Pspatial ≈ 1
since the differences in frequencies are negligible. Heuris-
tically, for Set I, Pduplexing = 1, Dduplexing = 1, since
the A blocks come as a pair. For Set II, Pduplexing = 0.5,
Dduplexing = 0.5. When interference considerations are taken
into account, things get complicated. Clearly, the D,E blocks
face interference from the lower C and upper A blocks which
is much smaller than the interference that may be faced by
the A blocks from Channel 51 transmissions or the E block
transmissions. Let us assume that the D,E blocks face negli-
gible interference (i.e., Pinterference = 1, Dinterference = 0
for Set II).
Let us consider Set I and the interference, only from Chan-
nel 51. In a very simplistic worst-case evaluation, one may
frequency1
T
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T
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Fig. 4. Worst Case Interference from Channel 51
assume that the Channel 51 transmissions use a rectangular
pulse shape which results in the classic sinc2 power spectral
density shown in Figure 4. If the 6 MHz band includes only the
main-lobe, the first dominant side-lobe is only 13 dB smaller
than the main lobe. With a transmit power of 1000 kW (=
90 dBm), the interfering signal starts at 77 dBm. Assuming
additional losses totaling 100 dB with geographical distances
and other factors, the perceived interference could still be
as high as -23 dBm 1. This can reduce the coverage in the
lower A block by a significant factor. Without considering a
full-blown analysis with specific geographical locations of the
TV transmitter, the service provider’s transmitter, and service
provider’s receivers, let us simply say that the probabilis-
tic score is Pinterference = pi and the distance score is
Dinterference = di. The overall fungibility scores for the two
sets will be:
PI = Pduplexing × Pinterference = pi (8)
DI = Dduplexing +Dinterference = di (9)
PII = 0.5 (10)
DII = 0.5 (11)
We have intentionally kept the scores simple and identical
(although this will not be the case with better models and
more data). The idea here is that the service provider will
pick Set I over Set II only if pi > 0.5 or di < 0.5. This
also assumes that the two sets have identical prices and that
frequency tunability is not a problem since the frequencies are
close.
Finally, the hardware costs for operating in the lower A
bands are likely to be larger in reality because most operators
1Of course, this is unlikely since better pulse shapes and filters are likely to
be employed by the TV transmission to contain its bandwidth and the transmit
power may not be as high either.
preferring the lower B and C bands are proposing to use a
separate band class for these bands [23]. If smartphones or
other devices are not built to operate in the lower A bands, even
if these bands face little interference in select geographical
areas, they may be unattractive to a potential secondary user.
We have not quantified this effect here.
B. The 700 MHz Bands and the 1.7 GHz AWS Bands
As a second illustrative example, we consider the AWS-1
paired bands [24] where the uplink is expected to use the 1700
MHz bands and the downlink, the 2100 MHz bands as shown
in Figure 5. Here, the preferred spectrum corresponds to the
lower B and C bands (total of 24 MHz – 12 MHz each for
the uplink and downlink). The alternatives are:
• Set I: Paired Cu bands in the upper 700 MHz
• Set II: Paired B bands in the AWS-1 Spectrum (see
Figure 5)
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Fig. 5. The AWS-1 Spectrum
We observe three differences between the previous case
study and this case study. First, duplexing is not a problem
since the alternatives come in pairs. Interference to/from
neighbors is also not a significant problem since the purpose
of the slices of spectrum being considered are similar and
they are expected to have similar protection from neighboring
transmissions. Second, the previous assumption we had made
about the bandwidths being identical does not apply here. The
preferred spectrum has a bandwidth of 24 MHz, while Set I has
22 MHz and Set II has 20 MHz. Finally, the spatial dimension
becomes important. While it is reasonable to assume that the
Cu bands have similar coverage compared to the preferred
lower B and C bands in the 700 MHz spectrum, this is unlikely
with the AWS-1 spectrum. Once again, using only appropriate
fractions 2 for calculating the fungibility scores, we arrive
at (using approximations involving only the uplink AWS-1
2We assume that f1 = 700 MHz and f2 = 1700 MHz, the transmit power
is 4 W, and the receiver sensitivity is -80 dBm to compute the distance score
using the free space loss. The distance score in this case turns out to be 0.59.
spectrum):
PI =
11
12
= 0.91 (12)
DI =
1
12
= 0.08 (13)
PII =
5
6
× 7
17
= 0.34 (14)
DII =
1
6
+ 0.59 = 0.76 (15)
Once again, very simple assumptions and models have been
used which seem to imply that the Cu bands are more fungible
than the AWS-1 bands, but perhaps not significantly, if the
costs are lower for acquiring access to the AWS-1 bands.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND CONSEQUENCES
Fungibility is a common assumption for market-based spec-
trum management. In this paper, we explored the dimensions
of practical fungibility from the point of view of the spectrum
buyer (which, we assert, is the relevant one). The complexity
of a fungibility determination described above means that
analyses dependent on this assumption should be reexamined.
Fundamentally, notions of fungibility, as with spectrum
trading, are built on a licensing regime that is neutral to the
technologies and services that providers used. As regulators
increasingly migrate from a transmitter to a receiver perspec-
tive [25], for instance, a service provider would have to use
the spectrum in a manner that did not cause interference with
neighbors. Thus, the buyer of a spectrum band may still have
to substantially alter the network (e.g., turn off base stations
to alter the deployment) that may render a spectrum band not
worth the cost.
It is also important to note that emergent technology trends
can have a large influence on fungibility, so it is important
not to consider it as a static notion in the realm of spectrum.
For example, the idea of small cells primarily for capacity
(as distinct from coverage) is emerging. In such a scenario,
a buyer may engineer a system with the same cell size for
different frequencies, so the weight of the spatial dimension
may be lower in the future. In another example, there is a
recent interest in the convergence of TDD and FDD systems,
which may reduce the weight of the duplexing dimension.
Finally, we focused on “naked” spectrum trading, though
this need not be the case in future. Forde et.al. [26] discuss
some possibilities for how the network operator business
models might evolve. For a variety of economic reasons one of
the suggestions focuses on the concept of the “cellular cloud”.
In such a system every operator becomes some kind of virtual
operator but not as we currently understand that term to mean.
In this conceptualization, the physical network will be owned
by some collection of entities (or indeed random individuals).
An operator will be an entity that combines physical resources
(base stations, back haul, spectrum etc) with applications and
content to make a service offering to potential customers. In
this model the network is “performed” into existence by the
operator to provide services to the end user. Spectrum in this
model is just one of a number of the physical resources that
needs to be procured either temporarily or for longer periods
of time. The fungibility metric can play a very useful role
in that procurement process. It allows this future operator to
for example to decide which chunks of spectrum combine
with which physical infrastructure options. It would allow the
operator to identify which bands can be used or combined etc,
allowing the operator decide how s/he will bid. In a somewhat
similar fashion, Lehr and Chapin [27] argued that, in future,
the small cell architecture would cause infrastructure to con-
centrate (economically), which would mean that competition
would have to exist at the service level (if at all).
While there are numerous technical and policy challenges
associated with these possible futures, from the perspective
of this paper, it is also worth considering how fungibility
might apply. When infrastructure and frequency bands can be
assumed, then service providers do not trade spectrum access
but rather for connectivity and reachability at a particular
QoS. The notion of “fungibility” then becomes less about the
parameters we discussed in this paper than about capabilities
that various infrastructures may offer. As in the case of
“naked” spectrum, fungibility in this sense may also not be
all-or-nothing. So, similar thinking about the substitutability
of complex, multidimensional objects would apply, even if the
determinants of these are different.
The preliminary work presented in this paper suggests a
richer followup studies. Such studies should include more
careful and detailed technical models, modeling user behavior
(using tools such as agent-based computational economics, as
was demonstrated by [28]) and revisiting prior studies (e.g.,
[1]) to assess the impact of fungibility scores on spectrum
trading systems. It also suggests that a focus on “naked”
spectrum may be too myopic – that a broader, service level
notion of fungibility should be developed in parallel.
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